By 1939, Otto Hahn had split uranium atoms by
bombarding them with other bits of radiation,
neutrons. And Fermi and Szilard had begun to build an
atomic pile to utilize the chain reaction. And a year
later, Otto Frisch and Rudolf Pierls described in a
three-page paper how uranium-235 could be assembled into a
critical mass producing an atomic explosion. And they noted:
"In addition to the destructive effects of the explosion
itself, the whole material of the bomb would be
transformed into a highly radioactive state. The energy radiated
by these active substances will amount to about 20 percent of
the energy liberated in the explosion, and the radiations would
be fatal to living beings even a long time after the explosion."
So, as early as that we had very much the picture of the
atomic bomb. And it didn't stay just on paper: The most
dramatic demonstration was on the 6th of August, 1945, when a
uranium bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on 400,000 people.20,000
died in the explosion and heat of the blast. Another bomb made
from plutonium was dropped on Nagasaki. By the end of the year,
120,000 people were dead at Hiroshima, a further 70,000 at
Nagasaki had died from the effects of the bomb. . . .
Since -- and of course, you know the story, we've been
hearing the story of the tests in many other places, by
the U.K., the U.S.S.R., the French, then the Chinese -- as of
1991, there had been 1,924 known nuclear tests, from which 400
had been carried out in the atmosphere, everybody on earth now
has strontium-90 in their body tissues. According to one
calculation, the increase in carbon-14 in the atmosphere will
cause a million serious defects amongst children and two million
embryonic and neo-natal deaths. Dr. Bertell has estimated, the
waste generated to produce these tests was already by 1985
generating 20 to 40 deaths per day world-wide or 7,000 to 15,000
deaths per year and will cause 13 million deaths by the year
2000.
It's not just the bomb that has been, if you like, a
test the whole way through, but so, in my view, has been
the whole of the nuclear fuel cycle. After all, what we have
done is to deploy a technology which is only partially
understood with an enormously destructive capability -- which is
known to be the case -- across the world -- in many cases on a
commercial scale -- as if we understood it completely. And the
results have been horrific. We've seen, for example, in the
Soviet Union at Chelyabinsk nuclear wastes simply dumped into
the Techa River until 1951 -- no processing at all; and of
course, on the 29th of September in 1957, a waste explosion
which released the equivalent of 20 million grams of radium --
about a quarter of the radiation released from Chernobyl -- in a
one-kilometer high cloud contaminating 217 towns with a
population of 270,000 people. We saw the accident at Three Mile
Island in the United States which revealed just how high the
risks have been. In its core, 16 tons of water per second were
pumped at 200 kilometers an hour through 40,000 radioactive fuel
rods, emitting the heat of 200,000 radiator bars. It is official
wisdom -- or was official wisdom -- that a melt-down due to a
failure in the cooling system would occur once in every billion
reactor years. The melt-down happened -- that time, it was mostly
contained within the reactor building. The next time, at
Chernobyl, it wasn't, and half the world was contaminated.
Prof Jim Falk, Australia. Professor at Wollogong University,
member of the Faculty of Science and Technology Studies,
main technical expert witness in the first case of a
Maralinga veteran vs. Commonwealth of Australia.
And, I think it's important to remember what fires that
scientific curiosity; we need to know what it is that is
attractive, that has produced this result. And it's good to
remember the pace of change, from Becquerel's discovery that
uranium, this bit of rock, released a radiation, in the same
year that they're able to generate a very similar thing from
x-rays, in 1898. The urge to reveal the structure of the things
in the rock that made that happen was irresistible. And the
desire to see what it could do to meet human ends was, of
course, also profoundly attractive. By the end of that year, the
Curies had isolated radium and polonium, totally unknown to
human beings in the entire history up to that time on the
planet. By 1939, Otto Hahn had split uranium atoms by
bombarding them with other bits of radiation,
neutrons. And Fermi and Szilard had begun to build an
atomic pile to utilize the chain reaction. And a year
later, Otto Frisch and Rudolf Pierls described in a
three-page paper how uranium-235 could be assembled into a
critical mass producing an atomic explosion. And they noted:
"In addition to the destructive effects of the explosion
itself, the whole material of the bomb would be
transformed into a highly radioactive state. The energy radiated
by these active substances will amount to about 20 percent of
the energy liberated in the explosion, and the radiations would
be fatal to living beings even a long time after the explosion."
So, as early as that we had very much the picture of the
atomic bomb. And it didn't stay just on paper: The most
dramatic demonstration was on the 6th of August, 1945, when a
uranium bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on 400,000 people.20,000
died in the explosion and heat of the blast. Another bomb made
from plutonium was dropped on Nagasaki. By the end of the year,
120,000 people were dead at Hiroshima, a further 70,000 at
Nagasaki had died from the effects of the bomb.
Now, the first thing to remember, because it helps us
understand how other things are forgotten, is that there
was a great scientific attractiveness to the understanding of
the forces that had been unleashed. And what is attractive in
science is not that these things are so complex, but they're so
simple -- that we can understand such a powerful phenomenon with
such simple ideas. Think of it! We know that uranium atoms
release neutrons -- put one in space, nothing can happen; put
another next to it, maybe once in a million years the neutron
might hit the other one, and maybe it might split -- if it does,
it releases another neutron. Start building up the number of
atoms around that, more and more occasionally, an atom will be
split, giving off more neutrons. At some point, as many neutrons
will be produced as are destroyed, and then you have a chain
reaction. And that is the critical mass that gives you an
explosion where every bit of energy from every splitting is
compounded into the heat and explosive force of a nuclear
weapon. It's such a simple idea.
Think about the cloud! When the bomb goes off, it
vaporizes into highly radioactive materials. It's very
hot, so it's lighter than air and so it rises. It rises very
fast because it's first of all very hot; the most unstable parts
-- atoms -- decay away most quickly, so it cools rapidly to start
with; and at some point, that rapidly rising column of hot gas reaches
a point where it is cool enough to be of the same density as the
air that it's in, and that's where it stops. A ball has expanded
out, because it is hot, full of the radioactive materials,
glowing, gas -- and then it starts to fall. And so we have the
mushroom. And because it's been moving up fast, it drags a
column of air with it, into which water vapour will first of all
vaporize and then condense and fill with steam, and that's the
column of the cloud. Such simple ideas against such dramatic
phenomena. This is the sort of thing that turns scientists on.
And there were so many questions that you could ask; I
mean, it wasn't just the question of a critical mass,
but could we make this thing smaller? Well, we knew that
beryllium reflected neutrons, so if we shoved some beryllium
around the outside, we could decrease the amount of uranium
because the neutrons would be denser, and so you'd need less
atoms in there, so we could make the bomb smaller. What about
increasing the fallout? Well, if we blow the thing up near the
ground, we're going to suck up lots of dirt and that's going to
be made radioactive, too, so it'll be a lot dirtier. It'll be
more radioactive -- let's try it and see! We can alter the
materials we make the bomb from -- what about plutonium? You only
need six kilograms of plutonium to make a critical mass, you
need ten of uranium, we can make a much more efficient little
bomb, which can be used in all sorts of different ways. We can
alter the type of the fallout -- what about dropping in some
cobalt to make some very widely-spread highly radioactive
fallout? Or what about -- could we make this thing arbitrarily
large in its explosive power? -- That took a bit of thinking and,
yes, it could be done; but here you had to do something rather
clever, which Teller is supposed to have thought of, which is
that you use a little fission bomb as a trigger and around that
you pack some deuterium and tritium, which are isotopes of
hydrogen -- we know if we exert a lot of pressure and energy on
those, they will compress sufficiently to fuse and release a lot
more energy. And then around that -- because what they do is,
release lots of neutrons -- we can put as much uranium as we
like, most of it will be turned into plutonium, and we can have
a critical, a super-critical mass, as big as we like; and we can
make a bomb arbitrarily powerful, as big as we might possibly
want.
So the motivation, the scientific motivation for testing is that
simple ideas can produce such powerful results. And, of course,
the interest of the scientists combine with the
interest of the military that some of these results just might
fit into strategies that they could dream up. The first test
then of the scientists' thinking was at Los Alamos. There was
the question of whether it might set up a chain reaction in the
atmosphere, which would have left us without one, but it
didn't. There was certainly very little concern about fallout.
Hiroshima and Nagasaki have to be seen as the second
tests -- they were with living targets! Different types
of bombs were used on each occasion, special measuring devices
were dropped, photographs were taken, the deaths were studied
with great technical interest, a sample of the living -- 120,000
survivors -- were picked out and followed throughout their
lifetimes to see what the effects of the radiation would
be.[1] Leukemia
started appearing after two years, peaking in 1954, in
1955 other cancers began to rise and are still appearing; and
much of what was then used to follow through with the other
tests of the nuclear technology came from that study: The safety
levels for radiation, 300 millisievert-units -- doesn't matter
what they are, really, they're a measure of the destruction to
tissue caused by radiation -- 300 in 1950, dropping to one
millisievert in 1985, dropping by a factor of 300, as
progressively scientists realized that their really crude models
had very little to do with the effect on human beings of
radiation. Amongst the causes of that dropping was a change in
the way it was modelled of very low doses, but also an
understanding that they'd got it completely wrong as to how much
radiation had actually been experienced at Hiroshima. And it was
now conceded that in 1980 you should have seen at least seven
times more cancers would be induced by a unit of radiation than
had been understood to be the case in 1977. So the radiation
levels, they too -- the permissible levels -- are experimental.
Inevitably, when you're deploying technology that you
don't understand very well and you know that it's
dangerous, and you know that you want to discover a lot more --
you don't put it in your own backyard; and the testing was
primarily done in the lands of the defenseless. Bikini Atoll in
1946 -- a 15 megaton bomb designed to produce maximum fallout
over the area, which "accidentally" -- inverted commas, I suspect
-- contaminated Rongelap and caused many cancers, some 23
radio-eugenic diseases in its victims. Later tests -- some 14
islands were contaminated and, as the Atomic Energy Commission's
director of Health and Safety said in 1956:
"While it's true the people don't live, I would say, the
way Westerners do, civilized people, it's nevertheless
also true these people are more like us than mice."
And so that's -- it's very helpful!
Since -- and of course, you know the story, we've been
hearing the story of the tests in many other places, by
the U.K., the U.S.S.R., the French, then the Chinese -- as of
1991, there had been 1,924 known nuclear tests, from which 400
had been carried out in the atmosphere, everybody on earth now
has strontium-90 in their body tissues. According to one
calculation, the increase in carbon-14 in the atmosphere will
cause a million serious defects amongst children and two million
embryonic and neo-natal deaths. Dr. Bertell has estimated, the
waste generated to produce these tests was already by 1985
generating 20 to 40 deaths per day world-wide or 7,000 to 15,000
deaths per year and will cause 13 million deaths by the year
2000.
It's not just the bomb that has been, if you like, a
test the whole way through, but so, in my view, has been
the whole of the nuclear fuel cycle. After all, what we have
done is to deploy a technology which is only partially
understood with an enormously destructive capability -- which is
known to be the case -- across the world -- in many cases on a
commercial scale -- as if we understood it completely. And the
results have been horrific. We've seen, for example, in the
Soviet Union at Chelyabinsk nuclear wastes simply dumped into
the Techa River until 1951 -- no processing at all; and of
course, on the 29th of September in 1957, a waste explosion
which released the equivalent of 20 million grams of radium --
about a quarter of the radiation released from Chernobyl -- in a
one-kilometer high cloud contaminating 217 towns with a
population of 270,000 people. We saw the accident at Three Mile
Island in the United States which revealed just how high the
risks have been. In its core, 16 tons of water per second were
pumped at 200 kilometers an hour through 40,000 radioactive fuel
rods, emitting the heat of 200,000 radiator bars. It is official
wisdom -- or was official wisdom -- that a melt-down due to a
failure in the cooling system would occur once in every billion
reactor years. The melt-down happened -- that time, it was mostly
contained within the reactor building. The next time, at
Chernobyl, it wasn't, and half the world was contaminated.
Now, if the nuclear explosions have been tests, their
success has been much overrated. At least in terms of
keeping the peace: Since testing began, there have been 127
conventional wars with 25 to 40 million casualties. But since
the end of the Cold War, we have at least seen a combination of
economic problems and a global anti-nuclear sentiment and a
declining tension between the superpowers cause a very
substantial reduction to begin in the superpower arsenals. In
addition, the Russians have ceased testing, the French have
temporarily ceased testing, and we stand at a historic
moment. But the forces which created the testing of nuclear technology
have not gone away. It remains a dangerous moment in human
history. The nuclear industry would like to revive its dream,
and the nuclear technology experiment could be pushed forward
from many sources. The decision to cut back weapons in the
arsenal acknowledges the failure of the military in either
country to establish much military use for nuclear weapons,
except for threatening each other. Their very extreme explosive
power makes them unusable, except in most extreme circumstances,
and that's always been a problem for the military. They would
like to make them more useable after all that investment. And
we've just had the Reed Report in the United States, produced
from the Strategic Deterrence Study Group, which is the group, a
sub-group, the group which produces the American Nuclear
Strategic Plan, the "single integrated operational plan". It
says: "We are not comfortable that we can count on deterrence to
deal with many lethal Third World threats." It recommends the
first use of U.S. nuclear weapons if any U.S. forces around the
world should face the threat of impending annihilation of remote
places around the globe. And so we have a pressure to keep testing,
to keep developing, to develop new huge hydrogen bombs. Here,
the defense establishment is developing a quite
imaginative reason: that the earth might be struck by asteroids
-- and we desperately need to develop a capability to shoot down
asteroids. I mean, the last time that happened, the dinosaurs
disappeared, and that wasn't very recent. But to develop also
very small bombs, ten-ton micronuke warheads, 100-ton mininuke
warheads, earth penetrators, enhanced magnetic pulse bombs which
can be blended with conventional warfare of the sort that the
United States' military establishment now expects to face in
wars in the Third World. And truly, the testing in the lands of
the less powerful will continue, if that is the case.
And it's also not true to say that nuclear weapons have
completely failed the test of usability: If we recall
the Gulf War, we should also recall that at that time there was
a fear that Iraq would use chemical weapons, and we should
recall that Iraq didn't. And the final piece of the puzzle we
should recall is that senior officials in both the United
States, United Kingdom and Israel all made very clear threats --
if not entirely explicit -- that in the event that chemical
weapons would be used, there would be no restrictions on the
weapons out of the Allied arsenals that would be used in
return. And I think every Third World country will have recognized one
thing from that encounter, and that is that nuclear weapons are
useful in military engagements, even if they're not actually
exploded. And that if you have one, you might make the nuclear
weapons of the other side less useful. And I believe that the
great crisis we now face is not so much the superpower arsenals
increase in the number of warheads, but the development of a
horizontal spread of nuclear weapons across many countries. We
already know that Israel, India have developed nuclear weapons,
we know that South Africa probably has developed a nuclear
weapon, we know that North and South Korea are in a position to
do so very quickly, we know that Brazil and Argentina moved some
direction towards that capability, but moved a little back
perhaps. Now we know that Japan will have generated the surplus
of 77 tons of plutonium, enough for 10,000 bombs, by the year
2100 -- allegedly to be used in its commercial nuclear fuel
cycle, but I'm talking about a surplus, a surplus above its
plans for its commercial nuclear fuel cycle. It's greater than
all the military plutonium ever produced in human history. And
that surplus will increase thereafter. Iran and Iraq are
obviously tense and have technological capability. The spread of
countries towards the threshold of nuclear development, the
accumulation of critical materials for the nuclear weapons
continues, and the pressure for it to continue is increasing. It
is not decreased by the tendency of the superpowers -- of the
remaining superpowers, nuclear weapon powers, anyway -- to
continue testing: At this point, the country that's doing that
is the United States, and the doctrines that it is developing
are very much the sorts of doctrines that will increase the
pressure for proliferation rather than decrease it.
There is a profound and urgent need for the nuclear
experiment to end. There is the possibility at this
important moment for a Complete Test Ban Treaty. Many of the
players have put the pieces in place for it. United States has
not, and its allies must now insist that the Complete Test Ban
Treaty be put in place. This conference has a role in that,
too.
In 1977, there was in Salzburg the Conference for a
Non-Nuclear Future, it was inspiring! Paul Leventhal
revealed that 200 tons of uranium had disappeared on the high
seas for Israel. It was a turning point, I think, in our
understanding of the problem of proliferation. After that,
Austria became nuclear-free. In the same time, nuclear power
plants world-wide began to be scaled back so that now there is
only going to be a tenth of the power plants operating that were
envisioned in the year 1977 by the year 2000. Five years after
the Salzburg conference, writing a history of the nuclear power
battle, I wrote: "The Salzburg style of meeting was a creative
experiment which could well be worth repeating." These Hearings,
15 years later, both reinforce the threat and promise spelled
out at the Salzburg conference. The nuclear experiment with its
live victims will be continued if we don't act. But if we do act
-- and these Hearings are a crucial component of the next phase --
then we can grasp the opportunity, which now seems much more
tangible than it did 15 years ago, to bring the deadly nuclear
experiment to an end.
Thank you.
____________
See Also: Bio-Medical
"Un-Knowledge" And Nuclear Pollution: A Common-Sense Proposal,
particularly, "Section 4,
Some Basic Rules of Believable Bio-Medical Research," and
"Section 5, Some Examples of
Rule-Breaking in Radiation Research," for a helpful enumeration of some
Rules of Research to measure the integrity and believability of any study
on the toxicity of a given pollutant by, and some concrete examples of
their violation -- including the Atomic-Bomb Survivor Study.
Father John
Thank you, Jim, and before you leave the floor, could we add something on top of that, clapping as we did this morning. One, two, three, thank you, Jim. (...)
I welcome Ian Zabarte and Gracelyn
Smallwood and [John] Hallam, please come on the stage. Ian
Zabarte is the director of the Nuclear Oversight Project of
the Western Shoshone Nation. Zabarte, welcome!